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A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the
process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the
social choice function for all beliefs at every type proﬁle. In an interdependent-value environment
with single-crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together
with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufﬁcient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct
mechanism. Strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for
robust implementation in any mechanism, including indirect ones. The contraction property requires
that the interdependence is not too high. In a linear signal model, the contraction property is equivalent
to an interdependence matrix having all eigenvalues smaller than one.
1. INTRODUCTION
The mechanism design literature provides a powerful characterization of which social choice
functions can be achieved when the designer has incomplete information about agents’ types. If
we assume a commonly known common prior over the possible types of agents, the revelation
principle establishes that if the social choice function can arise as an equilibrium in some
mechanism, then it will arise in a truthtelling equilibrium of the direct mechanism (where each
agent truthfully reports his type and the designer chooses an outcome assuming that they are
telling the truth). Thus, the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints characterize whether
a social choice function is implementable in this sense.
But, even if a truthtelling equilibrium of the direct mechanism exists, there is no guarantee
that there do not exist non-truthtelling equilibria that deliver unacceptable outcomes. For
this reason, the literature on full implementation has sought to show the existence of a
mechanism all of whose equilibria deliver the social choice function. A classic literature on
Bayesian implementation–Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b)
and Jackson (1991)–characterized when this is possible: a Bayesian monotonicity 1 condition
is necessary for full implementation, in addition to the Bayesian incentive compatibility
1. The Bayesian monotonicity condition is an incomplete information analogue of the classic “Maskin
monotonicity” condition shown to be necessary and almost sufﬁcient for complete information implementation by
Maskin (1999).
11751176 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
conditions. Bayesian monotonicity and Bayesian incentive compatibility are also “almost”
sufﬁcient for full implementation.
This important literature has had a limited impact on the more applied mechanism design
literature, despite the fact that the problem of multiple equilibria is real. An important
difﬁculty is that, in general, positive results rely on complicated indirect, or “augmented”,
mechanisms in which agents report more than their types. Such mechanisms appear impractical
to many researchers. We believe that the difﬁculty arises because the standard formulation
of the Bayesian implementation problem–assuming common knowledge of a common prior
on agents’ types and using equilibrium as solution concept–endows the planner with more
information than would be available in practice. The implementing mechanism and equilibrium
then rely on that information in an implausible way.
In this paper, we characterize when a social choice function can be robustly implemented.
We ﬁx a social choice environment including a description of the set of possible payoff types
for each agent. We ask when does there exist a mechanism with the property that every outcome
consistent with common knowledge of rationality agrees with the social choice function,
making no assumptions about agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about other agents’
payoff types. This requirement gives rise to an iterative deletion procedure: ﬁx a mechanism
and iteratively delete messages for each payoff type that are strictly dominated by another
message for each payoff type proﬁle and message proﬁle that has survived the procedure.
Consequently, our notion of robust implementation requires that truthtelling is the unique
rationalizable outcome in the incomplete information game deﬁned using the mechanism. This
notion of robust implementation is equivalent to requiring that every equilibrium on every
type space corresponding to the social choice environment delivers the right outcome. An
operational advantage of the iterative deﬁnition is that it is deﬁned relative to the payoff
type space rather than the much larger universal type space or union of all possible type
spaces.
This paper identiﬁes a class of environments where there are tight and easily understood
characterizations of when robust implementation is possible. As always, there will be an incen-
tive compatibility condition that is necessary: strict ex post incentive compatibility is necessary
for robust implementation. We show that if, in addition, a contraction property–which we
explain shortly–is satisﬁed, robust implementation is possible in the direct mechanism,w h e r e
each agent reports only his payoff type. If strict ex post incentive compatibility or the con-
traction property fails, then robust implementation is not possible in any mechanism. Thus the
augmented mechanisms used in the earlier complete information and Bayesian implementation
literatures do not perform better than the simpler direct mechanisms. An intuition for this result
is that the strong common knowledge assumptions used in the complete information and the
classic Bayesian implementation literatures can be exploited via complex augmented mecha-
nisms. Thus an attractive feature of our approach is that the robustness requirement reduces the
usefulness of complexity in mechanism design (without any ad hoc restrictions on complexity).
In the case of private values, strict ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to strict
dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. Thus full implementation is obtained for free. It
follows that the contraction property must have bite only if there are interdependent values.
In fact, the contraction property requires exactly that there is not too much interdependence in
agents’ types. The contraction property can be nicely illustrated in a class of interdependent
preferences in which the private types of the agents can be linearly aggregated. If θj is the
type of agent j, then agent i’s utility depends on θi + γ
 
j =i θj. Thus if γ  = 0, there are
interdependent values–agent j’s type will enter agent i’s utility assessment–but each agent
i cares differently about his own type than about other agents’ types. In this example, the
contraction property reduces to the requirement that |γ| < 1/(I − 1),w h e r eI is the number
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of agents. We provide characterizations of the contraction property–equivalent to the intuition
that there is no too much interdependence–in more general environments.
An important paper of Chung and Ely (2001) analysed auctions with interdependent
valuations under iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In a linear and symmetric
setting, they reported sufﬁcient conditions for direct implementation that coincide with the ones
derived here. We show that in the environment with linear aggregation, under strict incentive
compatibility, the basic insight extends from the single-unit auction model to general allocations
models, with elimination of strictly dominated actions only (thus Chung and Ely (2001) require
deletion of weakly dominated strategies only because incentive constraints are weak). We also
prove a converse result: if there is too much interdependence, then neither the direct nor any
augmented mechanism can robustly implement the social choice function.2
The main results of this paper apply to environments where each agent’s type proﬁle can
be aggregated into a one-dimensional sufﬁcient statistic for each player, where preferences
are single crossing with respect to that statistic. These restrictions incorporate many economic
models with interdependence in the literature. In particular, these restrictions immediately hold
in some well-known settings. They automatically hold in single- or multi-unit auctions when
each bidder demands at most one unit of the good. In this case, the aggregation function is
the utility function itself. The restrictions also encompass a widely-used statistical model with
interdependent values. Since the seminal contributions of Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1981),
the canonical model of common values is one in which each agent receives a conditionally
independent and identical signal about a one-dimensional common value. In this case, the
aggregator function is naturally given directly using Bayes’ rule. Subsequently, many allocation
models with interdependent–but not necessarily common–values use the same conditionally
independent and identically distributed information structure. Reny and Perry (2006) develop
strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium within a large double auction.
Here the value of the object for each agent is determined by a (perhaps non-linear) function of
a private and common value. A private signal jointly informs the agent about the private value
and the common value. In consequence, the value of the object is again given by a Bayesian
estimate as the natural aggregator function. We shall illustrate informational aggregation via
Bayes’ law and the relationship with the contraction property in Section 4.
We focus in this paper on economically important environments and well-behaved
mechanisms where we get clean and tight characterizations of the robust implementation
problem with direct or augmented mechanisms. The ex post incentive constraints necessary
for robust implementation are already strong (even without the contraction property): Jehiel,
Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) have shown that in an environment with multi-
dimensional signals, the ex post incentive constraints are “generically” impossible to satisfy.
If ex post incentive compatibility fails, our positive results are moot. While this provides a
natural limit for our analysis, there are many interesting applications for which ex post incentive
compatibility holds and the contraction property binds.
First, there is the large and important literature on one-dimensional interdependent type
models, including papers on auction environments (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Perry and
Reny, 2002; Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki, 2002), the bilateral trading model (Gresik, 1991;
Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu, 2003), and public and team decision problems without
transferable utilities (Gruener and Kiel, 2004). We illustrate our results with a public good
example with transfers, with a linear aggregator as described above; we also apply our results to
2. Bergemann and Morris (2009) described how to derive a strong converse to the original Chung and Ely
(2001) result for iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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the classic problem of allocating a single private good with quasilinear utility (i.e. a single-unit
auction with interdependent utility).
Second, even with multi-dimensional signals, there are many environments where econom-
ically natural “special” assumptions lead to a failure of the generic conditions as described by
Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006). For example, in any environment with
common interests and private information (e.g. Piketty (1999)) there will be ex post incentive
compatibility (whatever the dimension of private information), yet our contraction property
will imply the impossibility of robust implementation, as we discuss in section 6 for the one-
dimensional linear aggregator case. In section 8.1, we use a multi-dimensional version of our
public good example to illustrate an extension of our results to multi-dimensional signals with-
out the aggregation property. In this case, symmetry allows the existence of ex post incentive
compatible transfers. Further examples in the literature show that ex post incentive compat-
ibility (EPIC) is satisﬁed in multi-dimensional signal models without allocative externalities
(Bikhchandani (2006)) or with a separable structure (Eso and Maskin (2002)).
While we prove the necessity of the contraction property within single-crossing aggregator
environments, the necessity argument extends to general environments. In Bergemann and
Morris (2005a), we show that a robust monotonicity condition is necessary and almost
sufﬁcient for robust implementation in general environments with general mechanisms. The
robust monotonicity condition is equivalent to assuming the Bayesian monotonicity necessary
condition (from Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b) and Jackson
(1991)) on all possible type spaces. The contraction property is the simpler expression of this
robust monotonicity condition in the single-crossing aggregator environments of this paper.
The deﬁnition of the contraction property depends on the aggregation of the preferences.
But in section 8.1, we discuss a generalized contraction property–again capturing the idea of
moderate interdependence in preferences–that does not depend on an aggregation property or
one-dimensional signals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal
environment and solution concepts. Section 3 considers a public good example that illustrates
the main ideas and results of the paper. Section 4 establishes necessary conditions for
robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Section 5 reports sufﬁcient conditions
for robust implementation. Section 6 considers the preference environment with a linear
aggregation of types and obtains sharp implementation results. Section 7 considers a single-unit
auction with interdependent values as a second example of robust implementation. Section 8
concludes.
2. SETUP
Payoff environment. We consider a ﬁnite set of agents, 1,2,...,I. Agent i’s payoff
type is θi ∈  i,w h e r e i is a compact subset of the real line. We write θ = (θ1,...,θ1) ∈
 1 ×···× I =  .L e tX be a compact set of deterministic outcomes and let Y =  (X)
be the lottery space generated by the deterministic outcome space X. Each agent has a
von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility function ui : Y ×   → R. Let agent i’s utility
if outcome y is chosen and agents’ type proﬁle is θ be ui (y,θ). We emphasize that the utility
function of agent i is allowed to depend on the type proﬁle θ−i of the other agents. A social
choice function is a mapping f :   → Y.
Mechanisms. A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play
in order to determine the social outcome. Let Mi be a compact set of messages available to
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agent i.L e tg (m) be the outcome chosen if action proﬁle m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is
a collection
M = (M1,...,MI,g(·)),
where g : M → Y.T h edirect mechanism has the property that Mi =  i for all i and
g (θ) = f (θ).
Robust implementation. In a ﬁxed mechanism M, we call a correspondence S =
(S1,....,SI), with each Si :  i → 2Mi 
∅,amessage proﬁle of the agents. We will refer
to a message proﬁle in the direct mechanism where truthtelling is always possible as a report
proﬁle. Thus a report proﬁle β =
 
β1,...,βI
 
is described by
βi :  i → 2 i 
∅, for all i,
and θi ∈ βi (θi) for all i and θi.L e tβ∗ be the truthful report, with β∗
i (θi) = {θi} for all i and
θi.
Next we deﬁne the process of iterative elimination of never-best responses. We denote the
belief of agent i over message and payoff type proﬁles of the remaining agents by a Borel
measure λi:
λi ∈  (M−i ×  −i).
Let S0
i (θi) = Mi for all i and θi and deﬁne inductively:
Sk+1
i (θi) 
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
mi ∈ Mi
       
       
 
∃λi s.th.:
(1) λi
  
(mx−i,θ−i)
     mj ∈ Sk
j
 
θj
 
, ∀ j  = i
  
= 1
(2)
 
ui (g (mi,m −i),(θi,θ−i))dλi ≥  
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m −i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
dλi, ∀m 
i ∈ Mi.
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
We observe that Sk
i (θi) is non-increasing in k in the set-inclusion order for each θi. We denote
the limit set SM
i (θi) by:
SM
i (θi) 
 
k≥0
Sk
i (θi),f o ra l lθi ∈  i and all i.
We refer to the messages mi ∈ SM
i (θi) as the rationalizable messages of type θi of agent i
in mechanism M. We call a social choice function f robustly implementable if there exists a
mechanism M under which the social choice can be recovered through a process of iterative
elimination of never-best responses.
Deﬁnition 1. (Robust implementation) Social choice function f is robustly imple-
mented using mechanism M if m ∈ SM (θ) ⇒ g (m) = f (θ).
As we mentioned in the introduction, the above notion of robust implementation is
equivalent to requiring that every equilibrium on every type space corresponding to the
social choice environment delivers the right outcome. In other words, the set of rationalizable
messages for mechanism M is equal to the set of messages that could be played in a
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Bayesian equilibrium of the game generated using the mechanism M and some type space. The
basic logic of this equivalence result follows the well-known argument of Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987) who established, in complete information games, the equivalence of correlated
rationalizable actions and the set of actions that could be played in a subjective correlated
equilibrium. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) described a general incomplete information
extension of this observation. We report a formal version of the equivalence result for our
environment in Proposition 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2005a). As all subsequent results
work directly with the above iterative notion, we refer for the formal statements about the
equivalence to Bergemann and Morris (2005a).
Monotone aggregator. We now describe the structural assumptions that will be main-
tained throughout the rest of the paper. We assume the existence of a monotonic aggregator
hi (θ) for every i that allows us to rewrite the utility function of every agent i as:
ui (y,θ)  vi (y,hi (θ)),
where hi :   → R is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing in θi and vi : Y × R → R
is continuous in the aggregator (continuity with respect to lotteries follows from the vNM
assumption). The content of the aggregation assumption comes from the continuity requirement
and the following single-crossing condition.
Deﬁnition 2. (Strict single crossing) The utility function vi (y,φ) satisﬁes strict single
crossing (SSC) if for all φ<φ   <φ   :
vi (y,φ) >v i
 
y ,φ
 
and vi
 
y,φ  
= vi
 
y ,φ  
⇒ vi
 
y,φ   
<v i
 
y ,φ   
.
The single-crossing property is deﬁned relative to the aggregation φ = hi (θ) of all agents’
types. The combination of a monotonic aggregator representation of preferences and the SSC
condition will drive our results.
3. A PUBLIC GOOD EXAMPLE
We precede the formal results with an example illustrating the main insights of the paper
and reviewing some key ideas from the implementation literature. The example involves the
provision of a public good with quasilinear utility. The utility of each agent is given by:
ui (x,θ) =
⎛
⎝θi + γ
 
j =i
θj
⎞
⎠x0 + xi,
where x0 is the level of public good provided and xi is the monetary transfer to agent i.
The utility of agent i depends on his own type θi ∈ [0,1] and the type proﬁle of other
agents, θ−i ∈ [0,1]I−1. The weight γ ≥ 0 represents the strength of the interdependence in
the preferences of agent i. The utility function of agent i has the aggregation property with
hi (θ) = θi + γ
 
j =i
θj.
We notice that the aggregator function hi (θ) depends on the identity of agent i. In particular,
a given type proﬁle θ leads to a different aggregation result for i and j, provided that θi  = θj.
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The cost of establishing the public good is given by c(x0) = 1
2x2
0. The planner must choose
(x0,x 1,...,xI) ∈ R+ × RI to maximize social welfare, i.e. the sum of gross utilities minus the
cost of the public good:
 
(1 + γ (I − 1))
I  
i=1
θi
 
x0 −
1
2
x2
0.
The socially optimal level of the public good is therefore equal to
f0 (θ) = (1 + γ (I − 1))
I  
i=1
θi.
The generalized Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) transfers, unique up to a constant, that give
rise to ex post incentive compatibility are:
fi (θ) =−(1 + γ (I − 1))
⎛
⎝γθi
 
j =i
θj +
1
2
θ2
i
⎞
⎠.( 1 )
It is useful to observe that the generalized VCG transfers given by equation (1) guarantee ex
post incentive compatibility for any γ ∈ R+. Hence, ex post incentive compatibility does not
impose any constraint on the interdependence parameter γ. In contrast, the dominant-strategy
property of the VCG mechanism only holds with private values, or γ = 0, and fails for all
γ>0.
Now we shall argue that if γ<1/(I − 1), then the social choice function f is robustly
implementable in the direct mechanism where each agent reports his payoff type θi and the
planner chooses outcomes according to f on the assumption that agents are telling the truth.
Consider an iterative deletion procedure. Let β0 (θi) = [0,1] and, for each k = 1,2,...,l e t
βk (θi) be the set of reports that agent i might send, for some conjecture over his opponents’
types and reports, with the only restriction on his conjecture being that each type θj of agent
j sends a message in βk−1  
θj
 
.
Suppose that agent i has payoff type θi, but reports himself to be type θ 
i and has a point
conjecture that other agents have type proﬁle θ−i and report their types to be θ 
−i.T h e nh i s
expected payoff is a constant (1 + γ (I − 1)) times:
⎛
⎝θi + γ
 
j =i
θj
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝θ 
i +
 
j =i
θ 
j
⎞
⎠ −
⎛
⎝γθ 
i
 
j =i
θ 
j +
1
2
 
θ 
i
 2
⎞
⎠.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the report θ 
i is then:
θi + γ
⎛
⎝
 
j =i
θj
⎞
⎠ − γ
⎛
⎝
 
j =i
θ 
j
⎞
⎠ − θ 
i = 0,
s oh ew o u l dw i s ht os e t
θ 
i = θi + γ
 
j =i
 
θj − θ 
j
 
.
In other words, his best response to a misreport θ 
−i by the other agents is to report a type
so that the aggregate type from his point of view is exactly identical to the aggregate type
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generated by the true type proﬁle θ. Note that the above calculation also veriﬁes the strict ex
post incentive compatibility of f, as setting θ 
i = θi is the unique best response if θ 
j = θj for
all j  = i. The quadratic payoff/linear best response nature of this problem means that we can
characterize βk (θi) restricting attention to such point conjectures. In particular, we have
βk (θi) =
 
βk (θi),β
k
(θi)
 
,
where
β
k
(θi) = min
⎧
⎨
⎩
1,θi + γ max   
θ 
−i,θ−i
  
 
 θ 
j∈βk−1(θj) for all j =i
 
 
j =i
 
θj − θ 
j
 
⎫
⎬
⎭
= min
⎧
⎨
⎩
1,θi + γ max
θ−i
 
j =i
 
θj − βk−1  
θj
  
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
Analogously,
βk (θi) = max
⎧
⎨
⎩
0,θi − γ max
θ−i
 
j =i
 
β
k−1  
θj
 
− θj
 
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
Thus
β
k
(θi) = min
 
1,θi + (γ (I − 1))k 
,
and
βk (θi) = max
 
0,θi − (γ (I − 1))k 
.
Thus θ 
i  = θi ⇒ θ 
i / ∈ βk (θi) for sufﬁciently large k, provided that γ< 1
I−1.
Now consider what happens when this condition fails, i.e. γ ≥ 1
I−1. In this case, it is
possible to exploit the large amount of interdependence to construct beliefs over the opponents’
types such that all types are indistinguishable. Suppose that every type θi ∈ [0,1] has a
degenerate belief over the types of his opponents. In particular, type θi is convinced that
each of his opponents is of type θj [θi] given by:
θj [θi] 
1
2
+
1
γ (I − 1)
 
1
2
− θi
 
,
where the belief of i about j evidently depends on his type θi. In this case the aggregation of
the types leads to:
θi + γ
 
j =i
θj [θi] =
1
2
(1 + γ (I − 1)),
independent of θi. Thus in any mechanism, for each type, we can construct beliefs so that
there are no differences across types of agent i in terms of the actions which get deleted in the
iterative process.
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4. ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION
In our earlier work on robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris, 2005b), we showed
that ex post incentive compatibility is necessary and sufﬁcient for partial robust implementation
(i.e. ensuring that there exists an equilibrium consistent with the social choice function).
Deﬁnition 3. (ex post incentive compatibility) Social choice function f satisﬁes EPIC
if for all i, θ and θ 
i:
ui (f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)) ≥ ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
In the subsequent analysis we use the strict version of the incentive constraints as we require
full implementation.
Deﬁnition 4. (Strict ex post incentive compatibility) Social choice function f satisﬁes
strict ex post incentive compatibility (strict EPIC) if for all i, θ 
i  = θi and θ−i:
ui (f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)) >u i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
The key property for our analysis is the following contraction property.
Deﬁnition 5. (Contraction property) The aggregator functions h = (hi)I
i=1 satisfy the
contraction property if, for all β  = β∗, there exists i, θi and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) with θ 
i  = θi,s u c h
that
sign
 
θi − θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
, (2)
for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i).
The contraction property essentially says that for some agent i the direct impact of his
private signal θi on the aggregator hi (θ) is always sufﬁciently strong such that the difference
in the aggregated value between the true type proﬁle and the reported type proﬁle always has
the same sign as the difference between the true and reported type of agent i by itself.
How strong is the aggregator restriction on the environment? It requires that the payoff
types of the players can be aggregated into a variable that changes preferences in a monotonic
way. To get some sense of the strength of this restriction, we next consider two examples. The
ﬁrst example involves a binary outcome space which automatically guarantees the aggregation
property; the second example uses an informational foundation by means of Bayes’ law to
obtain the aggregation property.
Binary allocation model. Let each agent’s utility from outcomes depend on the payoff
type proﬁle only via a binary partition of the deterministic outcome space X. Thus, for each
i,t h e r ee x i s t sfi : X → {0,1}, w1
i : {0,1} ×   → R and w2
i : X → R such that
ui (x,θ) = w1
i (fi (x),θ) + w2
i (x).
In this case, we can write the agent’s utility over lotteries y ∈ Y =  (X) as
ui (y,θ) =
 
{x|fi(x)=1}
w1
i (1,θ)dy +
 
{x|fi(x)=0}
w1
i (0,θ)dy +
 
x∈X
w2
i (x)dy.
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An equivalent representation of this agent’s preferences is
 
{x|fi(x)=1}
 
w1
i (1,θ) − w1
i (0,θ)
 
dy +
 
x∈X
w2
i (x)dy = vi (y,hi (θ)),
with
hi (θ)  w1
i (1,θ) − w1
i (0,θ),
and
vi (y,hi (θ)) 
 
{x:fi(x)=1}
dy · hi (θ) +
 
x∈X
wi (x)dy.
Thus in such a binary allocation model, the aggregation property is satisﬁed automatically.
A natural example of a binary allocation model is an auction of many identical units of
a good to agents with unit demand for the good and quasilinear preferences. In this case, an
allocation is a pair (Z,z) ∈ X = 2{1,...,I} × RI where Z is the set of agents who are allocated a
unit of the good and zi is the payment of agent i. Now if agent i’s utility from being allocated
the good if the payoff type proﬁle is θ is given by vi (θ), then this ﬁts the above framework as
ui ((Z,z),θ) =
 
vi (θ) − zi,i f i ∈ Z,
−zi,o t h e r w i s e .
Information aggregation. A natural source of interdependence in preferences is infor-
mational, when an agent’s payoff type corresponds to a signal which ends up being correlated
with all agents’ expected values of a state. In particular, suppose that each agent i’s utility
depends on the expected value of an additive random variable ω0 + ωi,w h e r eω0 is a common
value component and ωi is the private value component. We describe the additive model with
two agents i and j (the generalization to many agents is immediate). The random variables
ω0,ω 1,ω 2 are assumed to be independently and normally distributed with zero mean and
variance σ2
0, σ2
1 and σ2
2 respectively. Let each agent i observe one signal θi = ω0 + ωi + εi,
where each εi is independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance τ2
i. We are thus
assuming that each agent observes only a one-dimensional signal, θi, of both the common
and the idiosyncratic component. Thus agent i, with his noisy signal θi, is unable to distin-
guish between the common and the private value component. But naturally his own signal
is more informative about his valuation than the others’ signals because it contains his own
idiosyncratic shock.
Now standard properties of the normal distribution (see DeGroot, 1970) imply that agent
i’s expected value of ω0 + ωi, given the vector of signals
 
θi,θj
 
is a constant
σ2
0τ2
i + σ2
0τ2
j + σ2
0σ2
i + σ2
0σ2
j + τ2
iτ2
j + τ2
iσ2
j + τ2
jσ2
i + σ2
iσ2
j
σ2
0τ2
i + σ2
0σ2
i + σ2
0σ2
j + τ2
jσ2
i + σ2
iσ2
j
times
hi (θ) = θi +
σ2
0τ2
i
σ2
0τ2
j + σ2
0σ2
i + σ2
0σ2
j + τ2
jσ2
i + σ2
iσ2
j
θj, (3)
where we write j for the other agent 3 − i. The calculations are reported in the Appendix. Now
if we assume that each agent i’s preferences conditional on hi (θ) satisfy SSC with respect to
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hi (θ), then we have an informational microfoundation for the SSC environment of the paper.
Moreover, in this example the aggregator takes the linear form hi (θ) = θi + γ ijθj,w i t h
γ ij =
σ2
0τ2
i
σ2
0τ2
j + σ2
0σ2
i + σ2
0σ2
j + τ2
jσ2
i + σ2
iσ2
j
.
This conclusion is quite intuitive. If the variance of the common component (σ2
0)i ss m a l lo ri f
the noise in one’s own signal (τ2
i) is small, then the interdependence goes away. But a reduction
in variance of one’s own idiosyncratic component (σ2
i), in one’s opponent’s idiosyncratic
component (σ2
j) or in one’s opponent’s noise (τ2
j) all tend to increase the interdependence.3
With this interpretation the single-crossing property with respect to the aggregator reduces
to assuming that there is a one-dimensional parameter whose expected value affects the
preferences and that there is a sufﬁcient statistic for the vector of signals that agents observe.
We now state our ﬁrst positive result.
Theorem 1. (Robust implementation) If a social choice function f satisﬁes strict
EPIC and the aggregator functions satisfy the contraction property, then f can be robustly
implemented in the direct mechanism.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Let β = SM and suppose that β  = β∗. Continuity of
each ui with respect to θ implies that each βi (θi) will be a compact set. By the contraction
property, there exists i and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) with θ 
i  = θi such that
sign
 
θi − θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
,
for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i). Thus by compactness
δ  min
θ−i∈ −i and θ 
−i∈β−i(θ−i)
   hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
    ,
is well deﬁned and strictly positive. Suppose (without loss of generality) that θi >θ  
i.L e t
ξ (ε)  max
θ 
−i
 
hi
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
− hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
.
As hi (·) is strictly increasing in θi, we know that ξ (ε) is increasing in ε and by continuity
of hi in θi, ξ (ε) → 0a sε → 0.
Thus we have
hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
≥ δ, (4)
for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ βi (θ−i);a n d
hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
≥ hi
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
− ξ (ε), (5)
3. The additive model with a private and a common component appears as described by Hong and Shum
(2003). Interestingly, they prove the existence and uniqueness of an increasing bidding strategy by appealing to a
dominant diagonal condition, which is implied by the contraction property. The example of a normal distribution fails
the compact type space assumption of our model, but we use the normal distribution here merely for its transparent
updating properties.
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for all θ 
−i. By strict EPIC,
vi
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,h i
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
>v i
 
f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
,h i
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
,
for all ε>0a n d
vi
 
f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
,h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
  
>v i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
  
,
for all ε>0. Now continuity of ui with respect to θ implies that for each ε>0a n dθ 
−i,t h e r e
exists φ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
 
∈ R such that:
hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
<φ ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
 
<h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
, (6)
and
vi
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,φ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
  
= vi
 
f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
,φ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
  
;
and SSC implies that:
vi
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,φ
 
<v i
 
f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
,φ
 
, (7)
for all φ>φ ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
 
.N o wﬁ xa n yε with
ξ (ε) <δ .( 8 )
Now for all θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i),
hi (θi,θ−i) ≥ hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
+ δ, using equation (4)
≥ hi
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
− ξ (ε) + δ, using equation (5)
>h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
, using equation (8)
≥ φ∗  
ε,θ 
−i
 
, using equation (6).
So
vi
 
f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
,h i (θi,θ−i)
 
>v i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,h i (θi,θ−i)
 
,
for every θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i) using equation (7). This contradicts our assumption that
β = SM.  
A surprising element in this result is that we do not need to impose any conditions on
how the social choice function varies with the type proﬁle. It does not have to respond to the
reported proﬁle θ in a manner similar to the response of any of the aggregators hi. The SSC
condition is sufﬁcient to make full use of the contraction property.
The argument is based on a true type proﬁle θ = (θi,θ−i) and a reported proﬁle
θ  =
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
, and without loss of generality θi >θ  
i. We use the contraction property to
establish a positive lower bound on the difference hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
for all θ−i and
θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i). With this positive lower bound, we then show that agent i is made strictly
better off by moving his misreport θ 
i marginally upwards in the direction of θi,i no t h e rw o r d s
to report θ 
i + ε. This is achieved by showing that there is an intermediate value φ∗ for the
aggregator, with hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
<φ ∗ <h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
, such that agent i with the utility proﬁle
corresponding to the aggregator value φ∗ would be indifferent between the social allocations
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f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
and f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
. By choosing ε sufﬁciently small, we know that h(θi,θ−i) >φ ∗
and SSC then allows us to assert that an agent with a true preference proﬁle θ = (θi,θ−i) would
also prefer to obtain f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
rather than f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
. But this yields the contradiction
to θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) being part of the ﬁxed point of the iterative elimination. Consequently we
show that the misreport θ 
i, which established the same sign on the difference between private
type proﬁles and aggregated public proﬁles can be eliminated as a best response to the set of
misreports of the remaining agents.
In the present environment with single crossing and aggregation, the contraction property
is equivalent to a notion of “robust monotonicity” by Bergemann and Morris (2005a). Social
choice function f satisﬁes robust monotonicity if for report proﬁle β  = β∗,t h e r ee x i s ti, θi,
θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) such that, for all θ 
−i ∈  −i, there exists y such that
ui (y,(θi,θ−i)) >u i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
(9)
for all θ−i such that θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i);a n d
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
≥ ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
(10)
for all θ  
i ∈  i.
It is now easy to see that the contraction property guarantees the validity of (9) and (10).
Fix θi and θ 
i and without loss of generality assume θi >θ  
i. By the contraction property it
follows that for every θ 
−i,w eh a v ehi (θi,θ−i) >h i
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
. Hence we can ﬁnd an ε>0
such that
hi (θi,θ−i) >h i
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
>h i
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
. (11)
But now we can choose the allocation y to be y = f
 
θ 
i + ε,θ 
−i
 
. Now equation (9) follows
from equation (11) and single crossing, and equation (10) follows from strict EPIC.
Bergemann and Morris (2005a) show that the above robust monotonicity condition is a
necessary and almost sufﬁcient condition for robust implementation, by following the classic
implementation literature in allowing the use of complicated–perhaps unbounded–augmented
mechanisms. In this paper, we show that the contraction property–equivalent to the robust
monotonicity condition–is sufﬁcient for implementation in the direct mechanism in single-
crossing aggregator environments.
5. NECESSITY OF CONTRACTION PROPERTY
We now show that the contraction property is necessary for robust implementation. We impose
the following mild restriction on the social choice function for the necessity argument.
Deﬁnition 6. (Responsive social choice function) Social choice function f is respon-
sive if for all θi  = θ 
i, there exists θ−i such that
f (θi,θ−i)  = f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
.
Responsiveness requires that a change in agent i’s report changes the social allocation for
some report of the other agents. The idea behind the necessity argument is to show that the
hypothesis of robust implementation leads inevitably to a conﬂict with a report proﬁle β which
fails to satisfy the contraction property.
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Theorem 2. (Necessity) If f is robustly implementable and is responsive, then f
satisﬁes strict EPIC and the aggregator functions satisfy the contraction property.
Proof. Suppose that f is responsive and robustly implemented by mechanism M.T h e
restriction to compact mechanisms ensures that SM is non-empty. Let m∗
i (θi) be any element
of SM
i (θi). Because mechanism M robustly implements f, g (m∗ (θ)) = f (θ),f o ra l lθ ∈  .
We ﬁrst establish strict EPIC. Suppose strict EPIC fails, then there exist i, θ and θ 
i  = θi
such that
ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,θ
 
≥ ui (f (θ),θ).
Now m∗ (θ) =
 
m∗
i (θi),m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
∈ SM (θ) implies that
max
m 
i
 
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
,(θi,θ−i)
  
= ui
 
g
 
m∗
i (θi),m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
= ui (f (θ),θ).
But
ui
 
g
 
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
,m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
= ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,θ
 
≥ ui (f (θ),θ),
and so
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
∈ argmax
m 
i
 
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
,(θi,θ−i)
  
which implies that m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
∈ SM
i (θi). This in turn implies that
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
= g
 
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
,m ∗
−i (θ−i)
 
= f (θi,θ−i), for all θ−i,
contradicting our assumption that f is responsive and robustly implemented by mechanism
M.
Now we establish the contraction property. First, suppose that mi ∈ Mi, θ 
i ∈  i, θ 
−i ∈
 −i,   m−i ∈ SM
−i
 
θ 
−i
 
and
ui
 
g (mi,   m−i),
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
>u i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
. (12)
Then, we have
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
/ ∈ argmax
m 
i
 
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,   m−i
 
,
 
θi,θ 
−i
   
,
as
ui
 
g
 
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
,   m−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
= ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
<u i
 
g (mi,   m−i),
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
.
Thus mi ∈ Mi, θ 
i ∈  i, θ 
−i ∈  −i and   m−i ∈ SM
−i
 
θ 
−i
 
imply
ui
 
g (mi,   m−i),
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
≤ ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
. (13)
Now consider an arbitrary report proﬁle β  = β∗.L e t  k be the largest k such that for every
i, θi and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi):
SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
⊆ Sk
i (θi).
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We know that such a   k exists because S0
i (θi) = Mi, and, as M robustly implements f,
responsiveness implies SM
i (θi) ∩ SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
= ∅.
Now we know that there exists i and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) such that
SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
  S
  k+1
i (θi).
Thus there exists   mi ∈ Mi such that   mi ∈ S
  k
i (θi) ∩ SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
and   mi / ∈ S
  k+1
i (θi) ∩ SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
.A s
message   mi gets deleted for θi at round   k + 1, we know that for every λi ∈  (M−i ×  −i)
such that
λi (m−i,θ−i) > 0 ⇒ mj ∈ S
  k
j
 
θj
 
for all j  = i,
there exists m∗
i such that
 
m−i,θ−i
λi (m−i,θ−i)ui
 
g
 
m∗
i ,m −i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
m−i,θ−i
λi (m−i,θ−i)ui (g (  mi,m −i),(θi,θ−i)).
Fix any θ 
−i ∈  −i and any   mj ∈ SM
j
 
θ 
j
 
, for each j  = i. Now the above claim remains
true if we restrict attention to distributions λi putting probability 1 on   m−i. Thus for every
ψi ∈  ( −i) such that
ψi (θ−i) > 0 ⇒   mj ∈ S
  k
j
 
θj
 
for all j  = i,
there exists m∗
i such that
 
θ−i
ψi (θ−i)ui
 
g
 
m∗
i ,   m−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
θ−i
ψi (θ−i)ui (g (  mi,   m−i),(θi,θ−i)).
Because   mi is never a best response, there must exist a mixed strategy μi ∈  (Mi) such that
 
mi
μi (mi)ui (g (mi,   m−i),(θi,θ−i)) >u i (g (  mi,   m−i),(θi,θ−i))
for all θ−i such that   m−i ∈ S
  k
−i (θ−i) (by the equivalence of “strictly dominated” and “never
a best response” (see Lemma 3 by Pearce, 1984).
But   m ∈ SM  
θ  
,s o( a sM robustly implements f), g (  mi,   m−i) = f
 
θ  
. Also observe
that if θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i),t h e n  m−i ∈ S
  k
−i (θ−i). Thus
 
mi
μi (mi)ui (g (mi,   m−i),(θi,θ−i)) >u i
 
f
 
θ  
,(θi,θ−i)
 
(14)
for all θ−i such that θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i).N o wl e ty be the lottery outcome generated by selecting
outcome g (mi,   m−i) with distribution μi on mi. Now we have established that for any β  = β∗,
there exist i,θi and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) with θ 
i  = θi such that, for any θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i),
ui
 
y,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
≤ ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
,
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using equation (13);
ui (y,(θi,θ−i)) >u i
 
f
 
θ  
,(θi,θ−i)
 
,
using equation (14); and
ui
 
y,
 
θi,θ 
−i
  
>u i
 
f
 
θ  
,
 
θi,θ 
−i
  
, (15)
which also follows from equation (14), as θ 
−i ∈ β−i
 
θ 
−i
 
).
Thus using the aggregator representation ui (y,θ)  vi (y,hi (θ)),w eh a v e
vi
 
y,hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
≤ vi
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,h i
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
, (16)
and
vi (y,hi (θi,θ−i)) >v i
 
f
 
θ  
,h i (θi,θ−i)
 
, (17)
and
vi
 
y,hi
 
θi,θ 
−i
  
>v i
 
f
 
θ  
,h i
 
θi,θ 
−i
  
. (18)
Now strict monotonicity of hi with respect to θi implies
sign
 
θi − θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi
 
θi,θ 
−i
 
− hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
;
combining this with the preference rankings in equations (16)–(18) and SSC, we have
sign
 
θi − θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
.
But now we have just stated the contraction property.  
The proof of the necessity of the contraction property (Theorem 2), but not of the sufﬁciency
(Theorem 1), uses the fact that the outcome space includes lotteries. We do not know if the
contraction property would be necessary for robust implementation with a deterministic domain.
However, if the deterministic social choice function is continuous in θ, we can prove the
weaker result that the contraction property is necessary for robust implementation in the direct
mechanism.
Restricting attention to responsive social choice functions simpliﬁes the statement of
the necessity result. The result could be re-stated to allow for non-responsive social choice
functions, with appropriate weakenings of the strict EPIC and contraction property conditions.
The weakened strict EPIC condition would require only that f (θi,θ−i)  = f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
for some
θ−i implies ui (f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)) >u i
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
for all θ−i. The weakened
contraction property would require only unacceptable report proﬁles β to satisfy the properties
required for all β  = β∗ in deﬁnition 4, where β is unacceptable only if there exists θ 
i ∈ βi (θi)
with f (θi,θ−i)  = f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
for some θ−i. The weakened strict EPIC and contraction
properties are equivalent to the original strict EPIC and contraction properties if f is responsive,
and are both automatically satisﬁed if f is constant. The weakened contraction property is a
joint property of the aggregator functions and the social choice function.
We brieﬂy sketch the idea of the proof. We establish the contraction property directly from
the robust implementation of the social choice function. We ﬁx an arbitrary report proﬁle
β  = β∗ and consider the iterative process of deleting strictly dominated messages. We identify
as t e pˆ k in the process as follows: let ˆ k be the earliest step at which for some agent i a
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rationalizable action ˆ mi for some type θ 
i fails to be rationalizable at step ˆ k + 1f o rs o m e
other type θi of agent i given that θ 
i ∈ βi (θi). As message ˆ mi is deleted for type θi,i ti s
never a best response for any message and type proﬁle by the remaining agents. It follows
that the message ˆ mi is strictly dominated for type θi of agent i by a possibly mixed strategy
μi (mi) of agent i. For every given message proﬁle ˆ m−i of the other agents, the mixed strategy
μi (mi) generates a lottery y over deterministic outcomes. We can now establish the preference
ranking of agent i with respect to the allocations y and f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
for any ˆ θ−i such that ˆ m−i is
a rationalizable action for types θ 
−i of the remaining agents. In turn, the contraction property
follows immediately from these rankings and the single-crossing property.
6. THE LINEAR MODEL
In this section, we consider the special case in which the preference aggregator hi (θ) is linear
for each i and given by
hi (θ) =
I  
j=1
γ ijθj,
with γ ij ∈ R for all i, j and γ ii > 0f o ra l li. Without loss of generality, we set γ ii = 1f o r
all i:
hi (θ) = θi +
 
j =i
γ ijθj.
The parameters γ ij represent the inﬂuence of the signal of agent j on the value of agent i.
With the exception of γ ii > 0f o ra l li, we do not impose any further ap r i o r isign restrictions
on γ ij. We denote the square matrix generated by the absolute values of γ ij, namely
   γ ij
   ,f o r
all i,j with i  = j and zero entries on the diagonal by  :
  
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
0
 
 γ 12
 
  ···
 
 γ 1I
 
 
   γ 21
    0
. . .
...    γ I1
    0
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
We refer to the matrix   as the interdependence matrix. The speciﬁc matrix   = 0 constitutes
the case of pure private values. We shall give necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the matrix
  to satisfy the contraction property. We then use duality theory to give a characterization of
the contraction property in terms of the eigenvalue of the matrix  . The proofs of all auxiliary
results are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. (Linear aggregator) The linear aggregator functions {hi (θ)}I
i=1 satisfy the
contraction property if and only if, for all c ∈ RI
+ with c  = 0, there exists i such that
ci >
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj. (19)
The absolute values in the matrix   are required to guarantee that the linear inequality (19)
implies the contraction property. Condition (19) is required to hold only for a single agent i.
© 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited1192 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
The proof of the contraction property is constructive. We identify for each player i an initial
report of the form βi (θi) = [θi − ciε,θi + ciε] for some ε>0, common across all agents.
T h es i z eo fci is therefore proportional to the size of the set of candidate misreports by agent i.
It can be thought of as the set of rationalizable strategies at an arbitrary stage k. The inequality
of the contraction property then says that for any arbitrary set of reports, characterized by the
vector c, there is always an agent i whose set of reports is too large (in the sense of being
rationalizable) relative to the set of reports by the remaining agents. It then follows that the set
of reports for this agent can be chosen smaller than ci, allowing us to reduce the set of possible
reports for a given agent i with a given type θi. Moreover, if the set of reports by i is too large,
then there is an “overhang” which can be “nipped and tucked”. Now a dual interpretation of
the condition (19) leads us from the idea of the overhang directly to the contraction property.
With the dual interpretation, we obtain the following simple test of the contraction property.
Proposition 1. (Contraction property and eigenvalue) The matrix   has the contrac-
tion property if and only if its largest eigenvalue λ<1.
The matrix algebra underlying the above characterization of the contraction property arises
in many economic problems which depend on the stability and uniqueness of solutions to
a system of linear equations, e.g. the uniqueness of equilibrium and rationalizable outcomes
in complete information games with linear best responses (see Luenberger, 1978; Gabay and
Moulin, 1980; Bernheim, 1984; Weinstein and Yildiz, 2007).
The linear model has the obvious advantage that the local conditions for contraction agree
with the global conditions for contraction as the derivatives of the mapping hi (θ) are constant
and independent of θ. We can naturally extend the idea behind the linear aggregator function
to a general non-linear and differentiable aggregator function hi (θ), but with a gap between
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. We report the results in the Appendix of a working paper
version of this paper (Bergemann and Morris, 2007b).
By linking the contraction property to the eigenvalue of the matrix  , we can immediately
obtain necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for robust implementation for different classes of
linear aggregators.
Symmetric preferences. In the symmetric model, the parameters for interdependent
values are given by
γ ij =
 
1, if j = i,
γ, if j  = i.
The eigenvalue λ of the resulting matrix satisﬁes: 1 + λ = 1 + γ (I − 1), and hence from
Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the necessary and sufﬁcient condition γ<1/(I − 1).
Common interest preferences. An important class of symmetric preferences is the case
of common interest preferences with γ = 1. In this case, for every I ≥ 2, the contraction
property will fail. This result tells us that if there are exact common interests, then robust
implementation will be impossible. This observation will hold for more general common interest
models, beyond the linear aggregator model of this section. The common interest model is an
interesting example in which the ex post incentive constraints will automatically be satisﬁed by
any efﬁcient social choice function. Yet the contraction property imposes a constraint leading
to the impossibility of robust implementation in common interest environments.
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Cyclic preferences. A weaker form of symmetry is incorporated in the following model
of cyclic preferences. Here, the interdependence matrix is determined by the distance between
i and j (modulo I), or γ ij = γ (i−j)modI. In this case, the positive eigenvalue is given by:
1 + λ = 1 +
 
j =i
γ (i−j),
and consequently a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for robust implementation is given by:
 
j =i
γ (i−j) < 1.
7. SINGLE UNIT AUCTION
We conclude our analysis with a second economic example, namely a single unit auction with
symmetric bidders. The model has I agents and agent i’s payoff type is θi ∈ [0,1]. If the type
proﬁle is θ, agent i’s valuation of the object is
θi + γ
 
j =i
θj,
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
An allocation rule in this context is a function y :   → [0,1]I,w h e r eyi (θ) is the
probability that agent i gets the object and so
 
i yi (θ) ≤ 1. The symmetric efﬁcient allocation
rule is given by:
y∗
i (θ) =
 
1
#{j|θj≥θk for all k},i fθi ≥ θk for all k,
0, if otherwise.
Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) have shown that the efﬁcient allocation can be
truthfully implemented in the generalized VCG mechanism, according to which the monetary
transfer of the winning agent i is given by
xi (θ) = max
j =i
 
θj
 
+ γ
 
j =i
θj.
The winning probability y∗
i (θ) and the monetary transfer are piecewise constant. The
generalized VCG mechanism therefore does not satisfy the strict EPIC conditions which we
assumed as part of our analysis. We therefore modify the generalized VCG mechanism to a
symmetric ε-efﬁcient allocation rule given by:
y∗∗
i (θ) = ε
θi
I
+ (1 − ε)y∗
i (θ).
Under this allocation rule, the object is not allocated with positive probability of order
ε.4 We show that the symmetric ε-efﬁcient allocation rule can be robustly implemented if
γ<1/(I − 1). Alternatively, we can say that the generalized VCG mechanism itself is robustly
virtually implementable if γ<1/(I − 1).
4. If the realized payoff type proﬁle is θ, the object will not be allocated to any agent with probability
ε
 
i (1 − θi)/I. At the cost of some additional algebra, we could modify the allocation rule so that it allocates
the object with probability 1 by deﬁning y∗∗
i (θ) = ε(θi/
 
j θj) + (1 − ε)y∗
i (θ).
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It is easy to verify that the resulting generalized VCG transfers satisfy strict EPIC and show
that this ε-efﬁcient allocation is robustly implementable. The unique (up to a constant) ex post
transfer rule is:
xi (θ) =
ε
2I
θ2
i +
εγ
I
⎛
⎝
 
j =i
θj
⎞
⎠θi + (1 − ε)
⎛
⎝max
j =i
⎧
⎨
⎩
θj + γ
 
j =i
θj
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠y∗
i (θ).
The ﬁrst two components of the transfers guarantee incentive compatibility with respect to the
linear probability assignment and the third component with respect to the efﬁcient allocation
rule. The best response of agent i for misreports θ 
−i of the remaining agents at a true type
proﬁle θ is given as in the public good example by:
θ 
i = θi + γ
 
j =i
 
θj − θ 
j
 
.
We can therefore exactly repeat our earlier argument in the context of the public good and get
robust implementation in the direct mechanism if γ<1/(I − 1).
8. DISCUSSION
8.1. Dimensionality and aggregation
We assumed that agents have one-dimensional payoff types, and each agent’s utility depends
on the proﬁle of agents’ types via an aggregating function. If the agents had multi-dimensional
payoff types, and there still existed an aggregator for the multi-dimensional types, then our
results would still go through, as the single-crossing condition is deﬁned with respect to the
aggregator rather than the types.
More interesting is what happens if the aggregator property fails, with one- or multi-
dimensional payoff types. The contraction property formalized the idea of moderate inter-
dependence under which the process of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies
continued until truthtelling remained the only surviving message for each type. Our deﬁnition
of the contraction property explicitly used the existence of an aggregator. But the notion of
moderate interdependence is meaningful in the absence of an aggregator. Informally, the idea
of moderate interdependence is that for every possible set of type proﬁles of all agents, there
exists an agent i and a type pair, θi and θ 
i, such that the ranking of any pair of alternatives, y
and y , is determined by the payoff type of agent i, irrespective of the type proﬁle of the other
agents.
More formally, let each  i be a compact subset of Rn (instead of compact subset of R)
and ﬁx a report proﬁle β =
 
β1,...,βI
 
of the agents and consider an agent i with type θi and
θ 
i ∈ βi (θi). We consider the preference ranking of agent i at a type proﬁle θ  with θ  ∈ β (θ).
A change in the preference proﬁle of agent i from θ 
i in the direction of θi is represented by a
convex combination εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i. As we change the preference proﬁle of agent i for small
ε>0 in this way, there may be preference reversals such that for some y and y , we observe
ui
 
y ,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
>u i
 
y,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
(20)
and
ui
 
y ,
 
εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
<u i
 
y,
 
εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
. (21)
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We then say that the preferences of agent i display the contraction property if the direction of
the preference reversal at θ 
i is predicated on θi in the sense that equations (20) and (21) imply
ui
 
y ,(θi,θ−i)
 
<u i (y,(θi,θ−i)), (22)
for all θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i). This new version of the contraction property is deﬁned independently
of an aggregation property or a dimensionality condition on the type of agent i. But it is
supposed to hold for all allocations y,y  ∈ Y, even those far away from any realization of the
social choice function. This makes it a very strong condition. We therefore propose a weaker,
but still sufﬁcient, condition for robust implementation in the direct mechanism by specializing
the contraction property to the set of relevant allocations. The two prominent allocations to
consider at the type proﬁles
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
and
 
εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
are
y   f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
, (23)
and
y  f
 
εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
. (24)
Now, if the social choice function f satisﬁes the ex post incentive compatibility, then y and
y  as given by equations (23) and (24) satisfy the hypothesis (20) and (21) by force of the ex
post incentive compatibility condition. A local contraction property can now be deﬁned for the
social choice function f.
Deﬁnition 7. (Local contraction property) Social choice function f satisﬁes the local
contraction property if, for all β  = β∗, there exists i,θi,θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) and ε>0, such that for
all θ−i,θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i) and all ε ∈ (0,ε]:
ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
<u i
 
f
 
εθi + (1 − ε)θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
. (25)
By a simple adaptation of the argument in Theorem 1, we can show that the local contraction
property of the social choice function is a sufﬁcient condition for robust implementation in the
direct mechanism.
Theorem 3. (Sufﬁciency) If social choice function f satisﬁes strict EPIC and the local
contraction property, then f can be robustly implemented in the direct mechanism.
It may be useful to illustrate the contraction property of the social choice function
with a multi-dimensional generalization of the earlier public good example. We consider
an environment with two agents, i = 1,2, where the payoff type of each agent i is a two-
dimensional vector θi =
 
θa
i ,θb
i
 
∈ [0,1]2. Each agent i has a quasilinear utility from a
two-dimensional public good x0 =
 
xa
0,xb
0
 
∈ R2
+:
ui (x,θ) =
 
α1θa
i + α2θb
i + γ 1θa
j + γ 2θb
j
 
xa
0 +
 
α1θb
i + α2θa
i + γ 1θb
j + γ 2θa
j
 
xb
0 + xi. (26)
We assume that α1,α2,γ1,γ2 > 0. The cost function of providing the public good is given by
c(x0) =
1
2
 
xa
0
 2 +
1
2
 
xb
0
 2
.
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The (efﬁcient) social choice f0 (θ) =
 
f a
0 (θ),fb
0 (θ)
 
determines the level of the public good
along each dimension l:
f l
0 (θ) 
 
α1 + γ 1
  
θl
1 + θl
2
 
+
 
α2 + γ 2
  
θm
1 + θm
2
 
, (27)
for l = a,b and l  = m. The efﬁcient social choice function f0 (θ) can be implemented with
the generalized VCG transfers:
fi (θ) =
−
 
θa
i θa
j + θb
iθb
j
   
k
 
αk + γ k
 
γ k
 
−
 
θa
i θb
j + θb
i θa
j
   
k
 
αk + γ k
 
γ k+1
 
−1
2
  
θa
i
 2 +
 
θb
i
 2   
k
 
αk + γ k
 
αk
 
− θa
i θb
i
  
k
 
αk + γ k
 
αk+1
  ,
(28)
where the sums over k are modulo 2. The generalized VCG mechanism (f0 (θ),f 1 (θ),f 2 (θ))
satisﬁes the strict ex post incentive constraints in the direct mechanism. The restriction to two
agents and a two-dimensional type space is for expositional ease only, and the results generalize
to I agents and a K dimensional type and allocation space.
Given the multi-dimensional type space and the multi-dimensional allocation space, it is
clear that in general, and speciﬁcally in this example, we cannot ﬁnd an aggregator function
to represent the preferences of the agents. Similarly, the preferences will not satisfy a single-
crossing condition due to the multi-dimensionality of the allocation space. But because of
symmetry across agents and across allocations, the social choice function is strictly ex post
incentive compatible.5
Proposition 1 (Multi-dimensional public goods). The multi-dimensional socialchoice function
(27) satisﬁes the local contraction property if
α1 + α2 >γ1 + γ 2. (29)
8.2. Relation to partial and ex post implementation
The results in this paper concern full implementation. An earlier paper of ours (Bergemann and
Morris, 2005b) addresses the analogous questions of robustness to rich type spaces, but looking
at the question of truthtelling in the direct mechanism. In the literature, this is frequently
referred to as partial implementation. The notion of partial implementation asks whether there
exists a mechanism such that some equilibrium under that mechanism implements the social
choice function. By the revelation principle, it is then sufﬁcient to look at truthtelling in
the direct mechanism. In the earlier paper (Bergemann and Morris, 2005b), we showed that
a social choice function robustly satisﬁes the interim incentive constraints, i.e. satisﬁes the
interim incentive constraints for any type space, if and only if the ex post incentive constraints
are satisﬁed.
It is important to note, however, that robust implementation is not equivalent to full ex
post implementation, i.e. the requirement that every ex post equilibrium delivers the right
5. The existence of an efﬁcient and ex post incentive compatible mechanism in the public good model does
not conﬂict with the generic impossibility of multi-dimensional ex post incentive compatible mechanism established
by Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006). The existence of ex post incentive compatible transfers
here is due to the symmetry across agents and allocations. We emphasize that the objective of the current example
is to show how the idea of moderate interdependence extends naturally beyond environments with the aggregation
property.
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outcome. Often ex post implementation will be possible–because there are no undesirable
ex post equilibria–even though there exist type spaces and interim equilibria that deliver
undesirable outcomes. In the earlier paper (Bergemann and Morris, 2008a), we identify the ex
post monotonicity condition that is necessary and sufﬁcient for full ex post implementation. It is
much weaker than the contraction property (and its equivalent robust monotonicity condition).
8.3. Robust and virtual implementation in general environments
The existing Bayesian implementation literature–Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey
and Srivastava (1989b) and Jackson (1991)–has shown that on a ﬁxed type space with
a common knowledge common prior, Bayesian incentive compatibility and a Bayesian
monotonicity condition are necessary and almost sufﬁcient for full implementation. The proof
of the sufﬁciency part of the result relies on complex augmented mechanisms.
In the earlier paper (Bergemann and Morris, 2005a), we developed the results in the
context of a general approach to robust implementation which allows for complex augmented
mechanism. The results reported in this subsection appear in that working paper.
Our robust implementation notion is equivalent to requiring Bayesian implementation on all
type spaces. Ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compatibility
on all type spaces. It is possible to deﬁne a notion of robust monotonicity which is equivalent
to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. Ex post incentive compatibility and robust
monotonicity are thus necessary and almost sufﬁcient for full implementation. However, this
result relies on allowing complex augmented mechanisms including integer games. If we restrict
attention to well-behaved mechanisms–with the compact message space assumption of this
paper–then strict EPIC is also necessary.
The contraction property is an implication of robust monotonicity in the environment studied
in this paper. The robust monotonicity condition requires the existence of allocations that can be
used to reward individuals for reporting deviations from desirable equilibria. In the environment
of this paper, we are able to show that we can always use rewards from misreports in the direct
mechanism.
In the single good auction example, we used an ε-efﬁcient allocation rule to obtain
strict EPIC. An alternative interpretation of the ε-efﬁcient allocation rule is that it virtually
implements the efﬁcient social choice function.6 This naturally leads to the question of how
much could be achieved with a robust version of virtual implementation. We pursue this
question in Bergemann and Morris (2009) and provide a characterization of robust virtual
implementation in general environments. Our general characterization requires complicated
augmented mechanisms, building on those by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b).
The reliance of positive virtual implementation results on such complex mechanisms has
often been criticized (Glazer and Rosenthal, 1992). But in the single-crossing monotonic
aggregator environment studied in this paper, we show that ex post incentive compatibility
and the contraction property are necessary for virtual robust implementation (as well as
for exact implementation) and also sufﬁcient for virtual robust implementation in the direct
mechanism. Thus, in the current environment, the only implication of going from full to
virtual implementation is a relaxation from strict EPIC to EPIC. Thus Bergemann and Morris
(2009) show that, by requiring robustness to beliefs and higher-order beliefs, the apparent
6. Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) obtain permissive results about virtual implementation under complete
information, using iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies as a solution concept. Abreu and Matsushima
(1992b) obtain incomplete information analogues of those results.
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permissiveness of virtual implementation is greatly reduced relative to exact implementation
(the notion studied in the current paper).7
8.4. Social choice correspondences and sets
We considered necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the robust implementation of a social
choice function. We brieﬂy discuss the relevance of our results for the robust implementation
of a social choice correspondence or a social choice set. A social choice correspondence is
a set-valued mapping F :   → 2Y. A social choice set is a set of social choice functions
F = {f |f :   → Y }. The concept of a social correspondence, prevalent in the complete
information literature (see Maskin, 1999), differs from the concept of a social choice set,
prevalent in the incomplete information literature (see Palfrey and Srivastava, 1989a; Jackson,
1991).
Our robust implementation results for social choice functions can be applied directly to the
notion of a social choice set. In other words a social choice set is robustly implementable if and
only if every element of the social choice set is robustly implementable. As the conditions for
robust implementation were deﬁned in terms of the utility environment and the social choice
function, robust implementation for a social choice set simply requires that every element of
the social choice set can be robustly implemented.
In contrast, it is substantially more difﬁcult to obtain necessary or sufﬁcient conditions for
the robust implementation of social choice correspondences. In the earlier paper (Bergemann
and Morris, 2005b), we showed that the difﬁculties with social choice correspondences already
arise with respect to the incentive constraints. In Example 1 of the earlier paper (Bergemann and
Morris, 2005b) we showed in a setting with two agents and two payoff types for each agent,
that a social choice correspondence can satisfy the relevant interim incentive compatibility
conditions for all type spaces, yet fail to satisfy the ex post incentive compatibility conditions.
A comprehensive analysis of the robust implementation of social choice correspondences
then ﬁrst requires additional insights into the nature of incentive constraints in social choice
correspondences.
8.5. The common prior assumption and strategic substitutes/complements
The deﬁnition of robust implementation in this paper is equivalent to requiring that every
equilibrium on every type space delivers outcomes consistent with the social choice function.
An interesting question is what happens when we look at an intermediate notion of robustness:
allowing all possible common prior type spaces. In the earlier paper (Bergemann and Morris,
2008b) we pursue this question in the context of our leading example of Section 3.
Consider the case of negative interdependence in valuations, i.e. γ<0, in the public good
example. We recall the ex post best response function in that example: if type θi is sure that
his opponents have type proﬁle θ−i and is sure that they will report themselves to be type
7. Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) show that an apparently weak “measurability” condition is the only
requirement–beyond incentive compatibility–for virtual implementation under incomplete information. Bergemann
and Morris (2009) show that a “robust measurability” condition is the robust analogue of the measurability condition
as described by Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) when beliefs and higher-order beliefs are not known. This robust
measurability condition is shown to be equivalent—in the single-crossing monotonic aggregator environment of this
paper—to the contraction property.
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proﬁle θ 
−i, then his best response is to report himself to be type θ 
i with
θ 
i = θi + γ
 
j =i
 
θj − θ 
j
 
.
We see that there are strategic complements in misreporting strategies (if others misreport
upwards, i has an incentive to misreport upwards). This means that when we carry out the
iterated deletion procedure, the proﬁle of largest and smallest misreports that survive must
constitute an ex post equilibrium of the game (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Thus a failure of
robust implementation also implies that there exists a bad equilibrium on any common prior
type space.
In the case with positive interdependence, i.e. γ>0, there is strategic substitutability
in misreports and the above argument does not go through. In fact, Bergemann and Morris
(2008b) show that if γ ∈ (0,1), even when the contraction property fails (i.e. γ> 1
I−1), every
equilibrium on any common prior type space delivers the right outcome. When we contrast
the robust implementation condition for all type spaces with those for all common prior type
spaces, it appears that the common prior leads to synchronized beliefs among the agents. This
restricts the set of possible best responses and allows for positive implementation results. In the
absence of a common prior, a sequential revelation of information may replace the role of the
common prior by generating synchronized beliefs among the agents. This theme is developed
in the context of an ascending auction as shown by Bergemann and Morris (2007a).
8.6. Informational foundation of interdependence
In the discussion of the single-crossing condition in Section 4, we present a statistical model
of noisy signals which naturally lead to the aggregation property of private signals by
means of Bayes’ law. There is a possible criticism of using an informational justiﬁcation
for interdependent preferences like this one at the same time as insisting on a stringent
robust implementation criterion.8 This informational microfoundation for the environment
depends on the common knowledge of the distribution of signals about the environment—
among the agents and the planner. Thus there is common knowledge of a true distribution
over the vectors of signals θ. However, we can show that if we allowed that each agent
i might receive additional, conditionally independent information–not necessarily consistent
with a common prior–about others’ signals θ−i, so that the information did not change
his expectation of ω0 + ωi, conditional on the vector θ, then our robust implementation
results would remain unchanged. Thus there is an admittedly stark story that reconciles the
robust implementation environment with an informational justiﬁcation of the reduced form
representation of interdependent preferences.
APPENDIX A
The appendix contains the arguments and proofs missing in the main text.
8. We thank Ilya Segal for prompting us to think about this in the context of robust implementation.
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A.1. Informational foundation for interdependence
The vector (ω0 + ω1,θ1,θ2) of random variables is normally distributed with mean zero and variance matrix:
⎛
⎝
σ2
0 + σ2
1 σ2
0 + σ2
1 σ2
0
σ2
0 + σ2
1 σ2
0 + σ2
1 + τ2
1 σ2
0
σ2
0 σ2
0 σ2 + σ2
2 + τ2
2
⎞
⎠.
By a standard property of the multi-variate normal distribution this implies that the expectation of ω0 + ω1 conditional
on θ1 and θ2 is given by:
 
σ2
0 + σ2
1 σ2
0
 
 
σ2
0 + τ2
1 + σ2
1 σ2
0
σ2
0 σ2
0 + σ2
2 + τ2
2
 −1  
θ1
θ2
 
,
which equals
 
σ2
0τ2
2 + σ2
0σ2
1 + σ2
0σ2
2 + τ2
2σ2
1 + σ2
1σ2
2
 
θ1 + σ2τ2
1θ2
σ2
0τ2
1 + σ2
0τ2
2 + σ2
0σ2
1 + σ2
0σ2
2 + τ2
1τ2
2 + τ2
1σ2
2 + τ2
2σ2
1 + σ2
1σ2
2
.
If we multiply the above expression by the constant
σ2
0τ2
1 + σ2
0τ2
2 + σ2
0σ2
1 + σ2
0σ2
2 + τ2
1τ2
2 + τ2
1σ2
2 + τ2
2σ2
1 + σ2
1σ2
2
σ2
0τ2
2 + σ2
0σ2
1 + σ2
0σ2
2 + τ2
2σ2
1 + σ2
1σ2
2
,
we obtain, as reported in equation (3):
θ1 +
σ2τ2
1
σ2
0τ2
2 + σ2
0σ2
1 + σ2
0σ2
2 + τ2
2σ2
1 + σ2
1σ2
2
θ2.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the contrapositive. Thus suppose there exists c ∈ RI
+ with c  = 0, such that for
all i:
ci ≤
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj.
We now show that this implies that the contraction property fails. Choose ε>0 such that 2ciε<θi − θi for all i.
Now consider reports of the form:
βi (θi) = [θi − εci,θi + εci] ∩  i,( A 1 )
for all i. Then for all i and all j  = i,l e tθj = 1
2
 
θj + θj
 
and let θ 
j = θj − εci if γ ij ≥ 0a n dθ 
j = θj + εci if
γ ij < 0. Using equation (A1), we have θ 
j ∈ βj
 
θj
 
for each j  = i. Also observe that γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
= ε
 
 γ ij
 
 cj.
Thus
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
= ε
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj ≥ εci.
Now if θ 
i = θi + εci, θi − θ 
i is strictly negative but
θi − θ 
i +
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
is non-negative. A symmetric argument works if θi >θ  
i. So the contraction property, which says that for all β  = β∗,
there exists i and θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) with θ 
i  = θi, such that
sign
 
θi − θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi (θi,θ−i) − hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
= sign
⎛
⎝θi − θ 
i +
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
⎞
⎠, (A2)
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for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i) fails. This proves the necessity of condition (19).
(⇐) To show sufﬁciency, suppose that condition (19) of the lemma holds. Fix any report β  = β∗.F o ra l lj,l e t :
cj = max
θ 
j∈βj
 
θj
 
   θ 
j − θj
   .
By hypothesis, there exists i such that ci >
 
j =i
 
 γ ij
 
 cj.L e t
 
 θi − θ 
i
 
  = ci, and suppose without loss of generality
that θi >θ  
i. Observe that for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i (θ−i): γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
≤
   γ ij
   cj. Thus
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
≤
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj;
and so from
 
θi − θ 
i
 
+
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
= ci +
 
j =i
γ ij
 
θj − θ 
j
 
≥ ci −
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj > 0,
it follows that the contraction property, and equivalently (A2), is satisﬁed.  
The following lemma gives a dual representation of the contraction property for the linear case. In turn, it allows
us to characterize the contraction property in terms of the largest eigenvalue of the interdependence matrix  .
Lemma 2. (Duality) The following two properties of   are equivalent:
1. for all c ∈ RI
+ with c  = 0, there exists i such that:
ci >
 
j =i
 
 γ ij
 
 cj; (A3)
2. there exists d ∈ RI
+ such that for all i:
di >
 
j =i
 
 γ ji
 
 dj. (A4)
Proof. Consider the following contrapositive restatement of condition (A3): there does not exist c ∈ RI
+ such
that
I  
i=1
ci > 0, (a)
and for all i :
 
j =i
   γ ij
   cj − ci ≥ 0. (bi)
Writing μ for the multiplier of constraint (a) and di for the multiplier of constraint (bi), Farkas’ lemma states that
such a c does not exist if and only if there exist d ∈ RI
+ and μ ∈ R+ such that
μ − di +
 
j =i
 
 γ ji
 
 dj = 0f o ra l li, (a’)
and
μ>0. (b’)
But this is true if and only if condition (A4) of the lemma holds.  
© 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited1202 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Proof of Proposition 1. If we try to ﬁnd a solution for the strict inequalities (A4):
di >
 
j =i
   γ ji
   dj, for all i,
with the assistance of a contraction constant λ<1, or
diλ =
 
j =i
 
 γ ji
 
 dj,
then by the Frobenius–Perron Theorem for non-negative matrices (see Minc, 1988, Theorem 1.4.2), there exist positive
right and left eigenvectors with the same positive eigenvalue λ. We can use the above dual property to establish that
a (λ,d) solution exists for:
λdi =
 
j =i
   γ ji
   dj,
but from the duality relationship (A4), we know that for every d>0,
di >
 
j =i
   γ ji
   dj,
so it follows that λ<1.  
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose ﬁrst the inequality (29) holds. Given a report proﬁle β  = β∗, we consider an
agent i such that
max
θi,θ 
i∈βi(θi)
 
 θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i
 
  ≥ max
θj,θ 
j∈βj
 
θj
 
 
 θa
j − θa 
j + θb
j − θb 
j
 
 . (A5)
Consider a pair of types θi,θ 
i ∈ βi (θi) which achieves the maximum in equation (A5), and assume without loss of
generality that the maximum is positive: θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i > 0. The indirect utility from the mechanism is given
by:
ui (f (m),θ) =
 
α1θa
i + α2θb
i + γ 1θa
j + γ 2θb
j
 
f a
0 (m)
+
 
α1θb
i + α2θa
i + γ 1θb
j + γ 2θa
j
 
f b
0 (m) + fi (m).
We want to show that the inequality (25) holds for some ε>0. As the indirect utility is a quadratic function in the
report proﬁle, it is sufﬁcient to consider the derivative of the indirect utility ui
 
f
 
(1 − ε)θ 
i + εθi,θ 
−i
 
,θ
 
with
respect to ε evaluated at ε = 0. After collecting terms, the derivative results in:
  
θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i
 
(α1 + α2) +
 
θa
j − θa 
j + θb
j − θb 
j
  
γ 1 + γ 2
  
 
α1 + α2 + γ 1 + γ 2
 
> 0, (A6)
where the strict inequality follows from the hypothesis of α1 + α2 >γ1 + γ 2, the inequality (A5):
 
 θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i
 
  ≥
 
 θa
j − θa 
j + θb
j − θb 
j
 
 ,
and the positivity of θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i > 0. (If the later sum were negative, then the sign of the derivative (A6)
would change and the same argument would go through.)
We prove the converse by contrapositive and assume that the inequality (29) is reversed to α1 + α2 ≤ γ 1 + γ 2.
We now consider a report proﬁle β  = β∗ such that
max
θi,θ 
i∈βi(θi)
 
 θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i
 
  = max
θj,θ 
j∈βj
 
θj
 
 
 θa
j − θa 
j + θb
j − θb 
j
 
 
and
θa
i − θa 
i + θb
i − θb 
i > 0 >θ a
j − θa 
j + θb
j − θb 
j .
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It follows that the strict inequality (A6) is reversed and this establishes the failure of the local contraction property of
the social choice function.  
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